Morality as Mere Convention? David and I duke it out.

Cameron R Waldman Okay, this is for you and David Kim: if you say "action x is morally wrong" then you are not a moral nihilist. For them, it would not be unintelligible to call any action right or wrong, because for them morality does not exist. But you guys have both told me that you think things can either be right or wrong, so do you still call yourselves moral nihilists?

3 hours ago · Comment · · See Wall-to-Wall

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    David Kim

    I think I'm still a nihilist. Action x is not "morally wrong," I just have a strong aversion to things like theft/murder/etc. because of social constraints, personal beliefs, and predispositions stemming from both, etc. But in no way am I prescribing these views, or even recommending them, to others on a moral basis. I just think my "moral code" is the best way for me, and people like me or in my situation, to live what Christian would call "a decent life." However, if you want to take a conventionalist view, and say that social conventions = morals (thus affecting my personal beliefs as well), then I suppose I'm an ethical subjectivist/moral relativist rather than a moral nihilist.
    
    The problem I'm most concerned about with regards to ethics is meta-ethics - where do ethical statements & judgments draw their power? I think rules like the be-kind rule are there because they promote a certain kind of good that's beneficial for society. But due to the variance and volatility of human existence, I seriously doubt the possibility of any sort of moral objectivity, thus precluding me from defining any moral laws (like the laws of physics, I liked that analogy).
    
    If a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to hear it, does it make a sound? The tree would certainly produce vibrations, but it wouldn't produce a "sound" which would be the subjective experience of those vibrations. In the same way, if someone lies, and no one is there to catch them, have they acted immorally? Not really sure how to or on what basis I can defend this... And just to add a little more merit to this stance, this line of thought has existed since the ancient philosophers, e.g. the sophist Antiphon and the Ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic.

    2 hours ago ·
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    Cameron R Waldman

    Where do ethical statements draw their power? Let me try to draw an analogy: genetic mutations are neither inherently good nor bad. They are random. But, this does not mean that the biological features that end up being expressed throughout generations are arbitrary or, even, conventional. By means of rationality we can predict which mutations will lead to species survival in different contexts. And, there can be a right answer to this. I think moral reasoning is similar in this way. There can be rational and correct answers to moral problems just as we can correctly predict which mutations will fare better into the future in certain evolutionary contexts.
    
    Surprisingly, I think our views are very similar. We both think about ethics existentially. However it seems that the difference between your view and mine is that your view has no place for rationality. Where as in my view, two people can argue and one person can be right. And I think that follows.

    2 hours ago · · 1 person
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    Cameron R Waldman Further, I don't think moral nihilists would want to be on an ethics team. For them, every answer to our cases would be, "N/A". That hardly seems helpful to anyone.

    2 hours ago · · 1 person
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    David Kim

    ‎1. Let's consider eyes. Organs sensitive to the visual spectrum of light developed because that was the most useful band of radiation to perceive (convention). But in darker places (different societies), animals developed organs sensitive to other types of radiation, e.g. infrared, and some, like those that live in caves, have, over generations, lost their eyes completely. This seems to indicate that some eyes are good in certain situations, different eyes are better in other situations, and sometimes, eyes are completely useless and superfluous (relativism). Could you elaborate on this statement: "By means of rationality we can predict which mutations will lead to species survival in different contexts" - so morals are, or aren't, contingent upon situation & circumstance? It could be the case that, like Socrates' desire and failure to define virtues like piety, justice, and beauty, my expectations/standards for a definition of a moral law is too high, and this is what is preventing me from defining satisfying moral laws. Maybe a moral law like "stealing is wrong" is too stringent and should be stretched, like Kantian maxims often are, to "stealing is wrong... unless you have a starving baby," etc.
    
    I'd like to hear your comments on this: the stance portrayed by the genetic mutation example seems consequentialist. This is what happened and it is self-evident that it is favorable because it was the one that survived. OK, I can accept a consequentialist view as an explanation as to why things came to be the way they are, à la On the Genealogy of Morality where Nietzsche talks about a Judeo-Christian "slave morality." But mere consequence doesn't provide a satisfying answer to the question of whether or not it is good, why it is good/bad, or why it survived. Did it survive because it really was the best trait (i.e. moral law), or because the ones with that trait were able to overpower the ones without? Are there other traits that are just as good?
    
    2. I think that's more the stance of an extreme skeptic, where everything is N/A. Nihilism definitely has an unfair negative connotation associated with it - I would argue that nihilists are most apt to debate ethics precisely because we are so removed. This distance grants you a certain clarity that is taken away when you subscribe to what you or society believes is a "moral truth." With a nihilist stance, you rely on only your rationality to lead you to the answer.
    
    I need to get back to studying; I'll check back + reply later tonight.

    45 minutes ago ·
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    Cameron R Waldman

    Relativism has no place for reason. Nihilism has no place for reason. If you think that there are rational reasons to explain why something is wrong or right, and especially if you think those reasons can be weighed against other reasons, then you are neither a relativist nor a nihilist. For a relativist, rationality, in the end, has nothing to do with morality. For a relativist, even if someone does have a rational reason for doing some action, that is not what makes an action right or wrong--for a relativist, that action is only right or wrong based on the mere fact that he or she has that belief to begin with. Full stop! That is what it means to be a conventionalist/relativist.
    
    "Organs sensitive to the visual spectrum of light developed because that was the most useful band of radiation to perceive (convention)." There is a difference between claiming that morality is merely conventional, and that morality sometimes (maybe even often times) coincides with convention. Convention is that which is done often by a given set of people. The "most useful" bit of that sentence implies that something else besides convention is going on. Yes, I suppose we can say that having eyes in a species is, I guess, a convention; however, that is not to say that having eyes occurs arbitrarily. The fact that we have eyes does not follow from convention, it follows from the reasons that make it good to have eyes in the first place. Convention, in this case, follows from good reason. Whether we have eyes that are good for the dark, or eyes that see in the day, or ears that give us sonar, similar underlying reasons exist for them. So even if different societies live in different environments, and have radically different views, we should admit that rational reasoning can and should underlie those beliefs. Morality is not just a matter of mere convention, morality is a matter of reason.
    
    I would love to talk about the consequentialism point you brought up. It's one of my favorites. But I think that would be a coffee chat or something we do when we get distracted at ethics meetings. I do have an answer. Also, even if my view is a consequentialist view, that's not a sufficient reason to reject it.

    2 minutes ago ·