CALL FOR PAPERS - “The Power to Imagine Better”: The Philosophy of Harry Potter

“The Power to Imagine Better”: The Philosophy of Harry Potter

This interdisciplinary conference will be held at the campus of

Marymount Manhattan College

221 East 71st Street

New York, New York 10021

Saturday, October 29, 2011, 10 a.m. – 6 p.m. (Regina Peruggi Room)

“We do not need magic to change the world, we carry all the power we need
inside ourselves already: we have the power to imagine better.”
—J. K. Rowling

Literary Scholar John Granger maintains that the *Harry Potter* corpus has become the “shared text” of the 21st century. Our attraction to this series, however, goes beyond its narrative appeal: the *Harry Potter* books contain a wide variety of philosophical themes that invite our study and discussion.

Submissions are welcome on any philosophical theme or issue arising in the *Harry Potter* corpus that intersects with metaphysics, ethics, religion, literature, and/or politics, not exceeding 20-25 minutes' presentation time (approximately 2,500 words). Please send full essay submissions with a 150-word abstract via email (in Word, rtf, or pdf) in a format suitable for blind review by April 1, 2011 to: cbiondi@mmm.edu. Notification of acceptance will be made by June 1, 2011, and a binder of the papers accepted for presentation will be made available to all of the presenters by the end of Summer 2011. (Conference registration fee will be $25.)

If you have any questions, please contact the Conference Coordinator, Carrie-Ann Biondi (Assistant Prof. of Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy & Religious Studies), at (212) 517-0637 or cbiondi@mmm.edu.

Call for Papers: Mid-Hudson Valley Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

Mid-Hudson Valley Undergraduate Philosophy Conference

April 15-16

Marist College

Poughkeepsie, NY

The Department of Philosophy & Religious Studies at Marist College will host the first Mid-Hudson Valley Undergraduate Philosophy Conference on April 15-16, 2011.

Undergraduates are encouraged to submit papers on any topic in philosophy. The keynote address will be given by Robert Kraut (Ohio State University).

Submissions: Please send papers of no more than 3,000 words by February 1, 2011. We prefer that papers be sent electronically by attachment in PDF or MS Word format to: James Snyder (james.snyder@marist.edu).

The program will be announced in early March.

2011 National Undergraduate Bioethics Conference

From its website:

"This year's National Undergraduate Bioethics Conference will be held at Duke University on March 18-20, 2011.

The National Undergraduate Bioethics Conference (NUBC) is sponsored annually by the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, and draws students from around the country in an engaging discourse on the ethical, social and legal implications of development in science, technology and medicine.

Hosted last year at the University of Puget Sound, this year's conference takes the theme "Bioethics: More Personal or More Global?" We hope the conference will encourage discussion about current controversies in bioethics, especially in the context of its evolution from a discipline concerned mainly with clinical medicine and biomedical technology to a broad field of inquiry in which global health and population-level bioethical issues are prevalent."

Visit http://nubc2011.org/ for more information and how to register.

ROVING ETHICIST LUNCHEON/DISCUSSION!

Hey Everyone!

Come to the Roving Ethicist Luncheon this Sunday at State Quad. The topic is: What are our moral responsibilities for bullied youths?

For more information, check out the Facebook event at http://www.facebook.com/event.php?eid=163728030312200

See you there!

-Cam

(I'm a senior undergraduate in the Philosophy Dept. for those of you who don't know me.)

Morality as Mere Convention? David and I duke it out.

Cameron R Waldman Okay, this is for you and David Kim: if you say "action x is morally wrong" then you are not a moral nihilist. For them, it would not be unintelligible to call any action right or wrong, because for them morality does not exist. But you guys have both told me that you think things can either be right or wrong, so do you still call yourselves moral nihilists?

3 hours ago · Comment · · See Wall-to-Wall

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    David Kim

    I think I'm still a nihilist. Action x is not "morally wrong," I just have a strong aversion to things like theft/murder/etc. because of social constraints, personal beliefs, and predispositions stemming from both, etc. But in no way am I prescribing these views, or even recommending them, to others on a moral basis. I just think my "moral code" is the best way for me, and people like me or in my situation, to live what Christian would call "a decent life." However, if you want to take a conventionalist view, and say that social conventions = morals (thus affecting my personal beliefs as well), then I suppose I'm an ethical subjectivist/moral relativist rather than a moral nihilist.
    
    The problem I'm most concerned about with regards to ethics is meta-ethics - where do ethical statements & judgments draw their power? I think rules like the be-kind rule are there because they promote a certain kind of good that's beneficial for society. But due to the variance and volatility of human existence, I seriously doubt the possibility of any sort of moral objectivity, thus precluding me from defining any moral laws (like the laws of physics, I liked that analogy).
    
    If a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to hear it, does it make a sound? The tree would certainly produce vibrations, but it wouldn't produce a "sound" which would be the subjective experience of those vibrations. In the same way, if someone lies, and no one is there to catch them, have they acted immorally? Not really sure how to or on what basis I can defend this... And just to add a little more merit to this stance, this line of thought has existed since the ancient philosophers, e.g. the sophist Antiphon and the Ring of Gyges in Plato's Republic.

    2 hours ago ·
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    Cameron R Waldman

    Where do ethical statements draw their power? Let me try to draw an analogy: genetic mutations are neither inherently good nor bad. They are random. But, this does not mean that the biological features that end up being expressed throughout generations are arbitrary or, even, conventional. By means of rationality we can predict which mutations will lead to species survival in different contexts. And, there can be a right answer to this. I think moral reasoning is similar in this way. There can be rational and correct answers to moral problems just as we can correctly predict which mutations will fare better into the future in certain evolutionary contexts.
    
    Surprisingly, I think our views are very similar. We both think about ethics existentially. However it seems that the difference between your view and mine is that your view has no place for rationality. Where as in my view, two people can argue and one person can be right. And I think that follows.

    2 hours ago · · 1 person
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    Cameron R Waldman Further, I don't think moral nihilists would want to be on an ethics team. For them, every answer to our cases would be, "N/A". That hardly seems helpful to anyone.

    2 hours ago · · 1 person
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    David Kim

    ‎1. Let's consider eyes. Organs sensitive to the visual spectrum of light developed because that was the most useful band of radiation to perceive (convention). But in darker places (different societies), animals developed organs sensitive to other types of radiation, e.g. infrared, and some, like those that live in caves, have, over generations, lost their eyes completely. This seems to indicate that some eyes are good in certain situations, different eyes are better in other situations, and sometimes, eyes are completely useless and superfluous (relativism). Could you elaborate on this statement: "By means of rationality we can predict which mutations will lead to species survival in different contexts" - so morals are, or aren't, contingent upon situation & circumstance? It could be the case that, like Socrates' desire and failure to define virtues like piety, justice, and beauty, my expectations/standards for a definition of a moral law is too high, and this is what is preventing me from defining satisfying moral laws. Maybe a moral law like "stealing is wrong" is too stringent and should be stretched, like Kantian maxims often are, to "stealing is wrong... unless you have a starving baby," etc.
    
    I'd like to hear your comments on this: the stance portrayed by the genetic mutation example seems consequentialist. This is what happened and it is self-evident that it is favorable because it was the one that survived. OK, I can accept a consequentialist view as an explanation as to why things came to be the way they are, à la On the Genealogy of Morality where Nietzsche talks about a Judeo-Christian "slave morality." But mere consequence doesn't provide a satisfying answer to the question of whether or not it is good, why it is good/bad, or why it survived. Did it survive because it really was the best trait (i.e. moral law), or because the ones with that trait were able to overpower the ones without? Are there other traits that are just as good?
    
    2. I think that's more the stance of an extreme skeptic, where everything is N/A. Nihilism definitely has an unfair negative connotation associated with it - I would argue that nihilists are most apt to debate ethics precisely because we are so removed. This distance grants you a certain clarity that is taken away when you subscribe to what you or society believes is a "moral truth." With a nihilist stance, you rely on only your rationality to lead you to the answer.
    
    I need to get back to studying; I'll check back + reply later tonight.

    45 minutes ago ·
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    Cameron R Waldman

    Relativism has no place for reason. Nihilism has no place for reason. If you think that there are rational reasons to explain why something is wrong or right, and especially if you think those reasons can be weighed against other reasons, then you are neither a relativist nor a nihilist. For a relativist, rationality, in the end, has nothing to do with morality. For a relativist, even if someone does have a rational reason for doing some action, that is not what makes an action right or wrong--for a relativist, that action is only right or wrong based on the mere fact that he or she has that belief to begin with. Full stop! That is what it means to be a conventionalist/relativist.
    
    "Organs sensitive to the visual spectrum of light developed because that was the most useful band of radiation to perceive (convention)." There is a difference between claiming that morality is merely conventional, and that morality sometimes (maybe even often times) coincides with convention. Convention is that which is done often by a given set of people. The "most useful" bit of that sentence implies that something else besides convention is going on. Yes, I suppose we can say that having eyes in a species is, I guess, a convention; however, that is not to say that having eyes occurs arbitrarily. The fact that we have eyes does not follow from convention, it follows from the reasons that make it good to have eyes in the first place. Convention, in this case, follows from good reason. Whether we have eyes that are good for the dark, or eyes that see in the day, or ears that give us sonar, similar underlying reasons exist for them. So even if different societies live in different environments, and have radically different views, we should admit that rational reasoning can and should underlie those beliefs. Morality is not just a matter of mere convention, morality is a matter of reason.
    
    I would love to talk about the consequentialism point you brought up. It's one of my favorites. But I think that would be a coffee chat or something we do when we get distracted at ethics meetings. I do have an answer. Also, even if my view is a consequentialist view, that's not a sufficient reason to reject it.

    2 minutes ago ·

Discussion Meeting

The Philosophical Society at Albany will be meeting Thursday, September 30th, at 7:30pm, in Humanities 290.

The topic is:

Would artificial life be subject to moral consideration? If we are able to create some machine with sentience/consciousness, would it be ethically okay to continue to use those machines as a means to an end? For example, if we use robots for military combat, and they are aware of the ethical implications of their actions, is forcing them to fight and kill acceptable? Or do we owe them the opportunity to choose for themselves? If we are planning to use a robot for a certain task, is it even ethical to give it the ability to realize all of this?

All are welcome and bring friends!

General Interest/Discussion Meeting

The Philosophical Society at Albany will be holding its first meeting of the fall semester next Thursday, September 16th, at 7:30pm in Humanities Conference Room 290.

As this is a general interest meeting for the most part we'll start off by introducing new members and talking a bit about the club and what we plan to do this year. Then, we'll go into discussion on the following topic:

For this meeting we'll be talking about aesthetics. What makes something beautiful? Can there be an objective view of beauty? How do we judge what is art and what isn't? Why is art important anyway, and what does it contribute to our well-being? How does mathematics play into our (perhaps unconscious) perception of a beautiful piece of art or music? What is it about music that makes us feel a certain way?

Please do come and feel free to bring friends; all majors are welcome, as always.